We study the performance of the first-price format in auctions with asymmetric common-values. We show that, contrary to the result for second price auctions, a small advantage for one player translates only to small changes in bidders' strategies, and the equilibrium remains close to the first-price equilibrium of the original game.
Introduction
Auction design has been in vogue lately because of the ongoing licensing process for the third generation mobile telephony services (UMTS) throughout Europe. In those auctions several countries established rules to counter potentially deleterious effects created by the presence of asymmetries among bidders. In the valuation of a 3G license there are common and private components. The common value arises because profit prospects depend on the development of the UMTS market as a whole, whereas the private value arises because of the economies of scope between the new services and the existing GSM business. Operators already active in GSM services (the incumbents) have an existing infrastructure, a pool of GSM subscribers and a database of potential customers which give them a distinct advantage. Also, an incumbent's failure to win a license would adversely impact its existing business. Since incumbents face better initial conditions than newcomers, the private component is asymmetric.
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Asymmetries are prevalent in most auctions in practice. They can be due to the presence of a bidder to be known to have a special interest beyond that of others in winning the auction.
2 They can also be generated by the presence of liquidity constraints. Firms that operate within imperfect capital markets face different costs of raising the amount of cash needed for their bids. Notice that differences in retained earnings, in values of assets appropriate for collateral, or, more generally, in access to external finance may easily cause asymmetries among bidders.
3
It is known that small asymmetries can crucially affect who wins, and at what price, in standard ascending auctions for common-value objects. When the auction is conducted 1 Goeree and Offerman (2003) analiyze competitive bidding in auctions with private and common components. In their set-up, bidders are ex-ante symmetric whereas here we are interested in auctions for which bidders are ex-ante asymmetric. 2 For example in the FCC auctions it was well known that PacTel had a special interest in acquiring licenses in Los Angeles and San Francisco (see Cramton, 1997) . 3 In the privatization of ENTel (an argentinean telecommunications company) the winner of the ENTel North (Bell Atlantic and Manufacturers Hanover Corporation) failed to arrange the financing necessary to meet their bid. ENTel North was awarded to the next bidder, a consortium of buyers including France
Telecom and J. P. Morgan.
as second-price, the bidder who has a disadvantage compared to her opponent (almost surely) never wins. 4 In equilibrium, the advantageous bidder plays a very aggressive strategy, whereas the disadvantageous plays very conservatively. 5 The rationale behind this equilibrium behavior is clear. Consider such an auction with two bidders in which they both know that one of them will have for sure a small additional private value whatever common value is realized, i.e. consider an almost common value auction. Because of the payoff advantage, in an ascending auction the stronger bidder can bid more aggressively, which forces the weaker bidder to bid even more cautiously in order to avoid a loss. The more cautious the behavior of the weaker bidder, the more aggressively the advantageous bidder can bid in this constellation. In equilibrium, the disadvantaged bidder never outbids the advantageous bidder, because she would make a loss in that case. But then a potential competitor with a slightly smaller valuation will see no point in entering the auction. 6 Moreover, this result holds even if the difference between types becomes negligible, so that the symmetric equilibriumà la Milgrom lies out of the equilibria limit set as one takes a sequence of auctions converging to the symmetric one.
7
The immediate moral is that a standard ascending auction may not be a good choice in an almost common value setting as the lack of competition will lower the prices very
substantially. An obvious reaction is to recommend using a first-price auction as "the outcome of a sealed-bid auction, in stark contrast to that of an ascending auction, is, it is believed, almost unaffected by small asymmetries among bidders". 8 But, how does it performs? We show here that the first-price auction gives a disadvantaged bidder a shot at winning. Certainly, an advantageous bidder is more likely to win a first-price auction as well, but the outcome there is much less certain as she cannot follow the 4 See Bikhandani (1988), Klemperer (1998) , and Bulow and Klemperer (2000) where second price common value auctions with asymmetric bidders are analyzed. 5 Nevertheless, the explosive effect reported in the two bidder case does not generalize to the addition of more disadvantageous bidders, as shown in Kagel and Levin (2005 strategy of bidding very high. Furthermore, the less aggressive bidding by the strong firms reduces the severity of the winner's curse faced by the weak ones, which encourages them to bid more strongly. Contrary to the results for second-price auctions, the firstprice almost common-value auction has a unique equilibrium (no matter the degree of comparative advantage) which converges uniformly to the symmetric equilibrium of the symmetric auction as the asymmetry vanishes. Hence, the symmetric equilibrium is the equilibrium limit as one takes a sequence of auctions converging to the symmetric one. In this equilibrium a disadvantaged player wins with strictly positive probability unless the asymmetry is so large that gives the advantaged bidder a larger ex-ante valuation than the most optimistic disadvantaged bidder. Consequently, potential competitors with a disadvantage may participate in the auction.
9
In view of recent debates over the format of government auctions, studying the effects of asymmetries on bidding outcomes is of practical as well as theoretical importance as asymmetries are the norm and not the exception in many auctions. 10 We conclude that a first price auction is a good allocation mechanism in the presence of asymmetries.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model. 
The Model
Two risk neutral bidders, player A (advantage) and player D (disadvantage), take part in a first-price auction: one object is auctioned off and given to the player with the highest bid who pays his bid. The value of the object to player A is αV, whereas player D's valuation is δV with α > δ (thus, player A has a higher ex-post valuation of the object). We will denote an auction in which the values are αV and δV by (α, δ)-auction. Throughout the paper we focus on a (k, 1)-auction, k > 1; however, as we go along, we will explain how the results extend easily to any (α, δ)-auction.
For each player V is unknown, but each of them gets a signal (x A and x D , respectively) about V before they submit their bids. 
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This canonical model encompasses different sources of asymmetries:
• It can be used to analyze situations in which the market value of the object is common to all bidders (i.e., they compete for common-value objects), but at the same time, each of them may have an additional private source of gains due to synergies. This could be the case if the object being auctioned off is a target firm in a takeover contest, a state-owned enterprise about to be privatized, or a bankrupted firm under liquidation. The literature refers to these auctions as almost commonvalue auctions.
• It can also be used for a pure common-value auctions in which bidders differ in their marginal utility of income due to the different financial constraints they may face.
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One simple way to model these differences is to consider that bidder A's utility iŝ
13 Since bidders'
11 By modelling the common value in this way, second derivatives with respect to signals vanish, which may be seen as a limitation. In Section ?? we undertake a robustness analysis. It shows that our results also hold if other, more general, functional forms were considered. 12 For more on auctions with financially constrained bidders, see Che and Gale (1998) . 13 In the US spectrum auctions designated firms were given bidding credits. These credits which were utility can be rewritten as
our set-up allows for this source of asymmetry, too.
Regions
Consider a (k, 1)-auction. This almost common-value auction is equivalent to a commonvalue auction in which bidders face interest rates given by r A = 1/k and r D = 1. Using this framework, it is easy to see that players' strategic behavior reflect two effects:
• Information effect: players will behave more aggressively the more optimistic is their information, i.e., the larger is their signal.
• Wealth effect: players will behave more aggressively the smaller is the interest rate they face.
The interplay between these two effects will determine the qualitative properties of the equilibrium. In particular, we can distinguish three potential cases by focusing on the impact of these two effects on the bidding behavior of an A player with signal 0, (A-0, for shortness):
Small asymmetries ( 1 ≤ k < 2), the information effect dominates and hence player Intermediate asymmetries ( 2 ≤ k < 3), the wealth effect partially dominates the information effect. The valuation of player A-0 conditional upon winning is larger intended to offset any disadvantage these firms faced in raising capital, see Cramton (2001) , constitute a good real life example of the existence of different financial constraints.
than the valuation of a type of player D with sufficiently pessimistic information.
In particular, there will exist a signal s(k), 0 < s(k) < 1, such that, in equilibrium, player A-0 wins over any player D with signal below s(k).
Large asymmetries ( k ≥ 3), the wealth effect dominates the information effect and hence player D will never win the auction. 14 The valuation of player A-0 conditional upon winning is larger than the one of player D-1, i.e.,
In what follows we analyze the equilibrium bidding strategies in the three possible scenarios. But first, we here state a lemma which guarantees the smoothness of the bidding functions when asymmetries are either small or intermediate.
holds, then over the common bidding range, bidders' equilibrium strategies are given by continuous and strictly increasing functions, b
Proof. See Appendix.
Small asymmetries:
When differences in values are small, so that the information effect dominates, we will show that there is a unique equilibrium in which bidding strategies, b 
14 In the Netherlands UMTS auction, the expected value of a license for the incumbents was estimated in 5 billions of euros whereas for entrants was estimated in 0.5 billions of euros. Asymmetries were hence large. 15 Throughout the paper, the subscript in the bidding function denotes the value of k, and the superscript denotes the identity of the player, i.e., A or D.
Notice that φ We can hence think of the problem faced by player D as choosing against whom to lose or, equivalently, choosing the opponent signals to beat. 16 Formally, a player D with signal x D chooses x A to maximize her expected utility:
is a continuous and strictly increasing function, with φ
Notice that player D's expected utility can be written as
A sufficient condition for this function to be differentiable is that
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Setting the derivatives of the expected utilities equal to zero, and using the definition of the equilibrium correspondences, we next characterize the equilibrium bid functions.
Lemma 2 For any k ∈ [1, 2), the necessary and sufficient conditions for the bidding
to form a Nash equilibrium are that they are increasing functions solving the differential system
with boundary conditions:
system above which has two differential equations is, in fact, a system of four differential equations. Notice that by 16 A similar approach is taken in Bulow, Huang and Klemperer (1999) . 17 In the Appendix we show the differentiability of the expected utility. 
Integrating (3) , we get
Similarly, integrating (4) , we get
Using (5), (6) and the boundary condition b
we can get explicit expressions for the bidding functions after integrating the equations (3) and (4). The resulting bidding functions are:
, and (7)
The upper boundary condition b
· Hence, the maximum bid is a strictly increasing function in the degree of asymmetry as measured by k. Finally, L'Hôpital rule and φ
Using these bidding functions we next characterize the equilibrium correspondences.
Proposition 3
The following statements hold:
are uniquely implicitly defined by the equations
and
Proof. We here only show the result for φ (8) into (2), we get the differential equation
which is a homogeneous equation with boundary condition φ
,
as claimed.
To end the proof we now show that implicit equation above has a unique positive solution φ 
We now proceed to analyze the properties of the equilibrium correspondences. We first present the results and then discuss their implications.
Proposition 4 An advantageous bidder is more likely to win the auction as, φ
holds for all x ∈ (0, 1) and for any k ∈ (1, 2).
Proof. Let k > 1 be fixed. Assume, by way of contradiction, that there exists x ∈ (0, 1)
which easily simplifies to x 2k−1 = x. Since k > 1 this equality only holds if x = 0 or Evaluating equation (10) at x = 1/2, straightforward computations give:
Since φ
for all x ∈ (0, 1) and for all k ∈ (1, 2), as claimed Proposition 5 For any given x ∈ (0, 1), the equilibrium correspondence functions satisfy
Proof. For any pair k 1 , k 2 such that 1 < k 1 < k 2 < 2, incentive compatibility implies that the following inequalities must hold in equilibrium:
Adding up inequalities above gives
. This result and the inverse relationship between the equilibrium correspondences imply (i) and (ii).
Regarding (iii), if x = 0 or x = 1, it hods trivially. We can hence concentrate in the case x ∈ (0, 1). Consider the sequence {φ D kn (x)} as {k n } → 1 (with all k n ∈ (1, 2)). For any n, equation (10) yields
Moreover, for any x there exists ǫ x > 0 such that (k n x + φ D kn )/(k n + 1) > ǫ x holds for large enough n. Consequently,
and statement (iii) follows. Similar arguments apply for φ A kn (x) which completes the proof.
The implications of discussions above and Proposition 5 are several:
• The probabilities of winning the auction are sensitive to the degree of comparative advantage. In particular, the larger is k, the more likely is for the advantageous player to win the auction.
• Increasing the comparative advantage (as measured by k) makes the advantageous player to bid more aggressively. That is
. This is what we expect as a higher k makes the A bidder more eager to win. As for the D player, we know that when she has sufficiently optimistic information (in particular when x D = 1), she bids more aggressively if k is increased. Our conjecture is that the opposite should hold for types of the D bidder with sufficiently pessimistic information. The intuition is that they face a larger winner's curse of winning against a more aggressive A bidder, and this should make them reluctant to increase their bid.
• The profits of the advantageous (disadvantageous) bidder are strictly increasing (decreasing) in k. Notice that from the Envelope Theorem we have
dz which is strictly decreasing in k.
• Finally, Proposition 5-(iii) suggests that as the auction converges to a symmetric one in which both bidders are known to be D-type, the strategies converge to the unique symmetric equilibrium strategies of the symmetric auction. Next theorem shows that this is indeed the case. 
. We want to show that, given ε > 0, there exist k 0 such that
To do so we notice that, for a fixed k > 1, the equation
′ (x D ) = 1 has a unique solution (in (0, 1)) lying in the straight line
The 
3.2 Intermediate asymmetries: 2 ≤ k < 3.
As the difference in values increase, the information effect no longer dominates and hence players A-0 and D-0 behave differently in the auction. In particular, player A-0 must win the auction with positive probability. In this scenario, there will exist a signal s(k) > 0 for the disadvantageous bidder such that b Proof. Clearly, D-s(k) cannot make negative profits or she would be better off by reducing her bid so as to lose with probability one. But she cannot make positive profits either. Otherwise, a D player with signal s(k) − ε would have incentives to raise her bid, a contradiction with equilibrium behavior.
The result for the A-0 bidder follows from the definition of s(k). Since conditional upon winning bidder A − 0 and bidder D − s(k) assign the same value to the object,
The equilibrium bidding strategies of players with signals x A > r(k) and x D > s(k), are increasing differentiable functions, which are solutions of the system given by equations (3) and (4) with boundary conditions b
Integrating, and using the boundary conditions, we get explicit expressions for the truncated bidding functions (b
In what follows, we show that b
given by (13) are equilibrium bidding strategies.
Proposition 9 The bidding functions b
, given by (12) and (13), constitute an equilibrium of the (k, 1)-auction for any k ∈ [2, 3). Furthermore,
Proof. Clearly a D player with signal below s(k) does not want to deviate up so as to win over some types of player A. Just notice that the minimum bid is larger than her value conditional upon winning. Similarly, a D player with signal larger than s(k) plays a best response against the strategy of the A player. There is hence no profitable deviation for the D player. Consider now the A player. If her signal is y and it is below r(k), her expected profit when playing the equilibrium strategy is
Since the A player with signal r(k) does not want to deviate up (recall that the truncated bidding functions are best reply to each other), then no other type with worse information will want to deviate either. Thus the only deviation we have to consider is a deviation to a bid below ks(k)/2. Let β be such that β <
. For any y, y ∈ [0, r(k)], the expected profit when bidding β is
The probability of winning is now smaller but, further, the profit when winning is also smaller. Notice that
We hence conclude that no deviation down is profitable as
and all y ≤ r(k).
Finally, the A player with signal larger than r(k) plays a best response against the strategy of the D player. So the purported strategies constitute an equilibrium. Since over the common bidding range, the functional forms of the equilibrium bidding functions coincide with the ones obtained for small asymmetries, the equilibrium correspondences φ (9) and (10) . Using those equations we can fully characterize the minimum winning bid. In particular, straightforward computations yield: α(3) = 3/2. These results suggest that as k converges to 3 the probability of winning the auction for the D player converges to zero. Next subsection shows that this is indeed the case.
Large asymmetries: k ≥ 3
When the asymmetry in values is such that the A-0 player can assign to the object a larger ex-ante expected value than the most optimistic D player (i.e. when k/2 ≥ 3/2) then, in any equilibrium, the A player must win the auction.
Proposition 10
The following strategies constitute an equilibrium of the (k, 1)-auction game for any k ≥ 3,
Proof. We first show that no type of player D wants to deviate. At the purported equilibrium strategies player D gets zero profits. By deviating and bidding more than 3/2, she gets negative profits as she would pay more than the true value conditional on her winning. Notice that, conditional on winning, the value is bounded above by 3/2 for any D player.
Consider now the A player. We now show that type 0 prefers to outbid all types of player D rather than a set of them. At the purported equilibrium the profits of type 0 are:
Consider now a bid equal to m such that 1/2 ≤ m < 3/2. She wins over all types of D smaller than y where y is such that y + 1/2 = m. Her expected profits from bidding m
Since her probability of winning with a bid equal to m is below one, we have
). If type 0 does not find profitable to deviate, then no other type will have incentives to deviate either, which completes the proof.
Equilibrium above is qualitatively unique as in any equilibrium for k ≥ 3, the advantageous bidder always bids 3/2 and the disadvantageous (almost) never wins. 
(α, δ)−Auctions
To end this section we now show how our results generalize to any (α, δ)-auction, α > δ > 0. In particular, we now show that a (α, δ)-auction is strategically equivalent to a 
Proof. Two cases have to be considered depending on whether α/δ ≥ 3 or α/δ < 3.
If α/δ ≥ 3, similar arguments to the ones used in the proof of Proposition 10 ensure
, and
constitute an equilibrium of the (α, δ)-auction game.
If α/δ < 3, the equilibrium bidding functions over the common range of bidding prices have to be increasing functions solving the system of differential equations
where φ 
Expected Revenue
Expected revenue to the seller is the sum of the ex-ante expected payments by the players.
For player i with signal x i , her interim expected payment will be b
For the advantaged player it increases with k as both her bid and her probability of winning are increasing functions of k. For the disadvantaged player her expected payment will be (most likely) decreasing in k for sufficiently pessimistic information. Nevertheless, for the most optimistic D player the opposite holds as her bid increases with k whereas her probability of winning is always one. The impact of k on the expected revenue is hence unclear a priory.
To compute the expected revenue we first note that integrating by parts equation (3) results in
where,
is derived from equation (6) . Similarly,
Changing variables in (15) , take x = φ A k (t), revenue to the seller becomes
Bikhchandani (1988) and Klemperer (1998) have shown that second-price auctions are considerably less desirable for the seller in asymmetric environments than in symmetric ones. They showed that a small asymmetry in values has a large impact on the seller's expected revenues. We have shown here that a small asymmetry in values has only a small impact on outcomes when the auction is conducted as a first-price auction. But, further, we now show that it is beneficial for the seller.
Proposition 12 A small asymmetry in values is beneficial for the seller.
Proof. Differentiating equation (16) with respect to k gives
Using the fact that φ 
Table above suggests that the seller's revenue increases with the degree of comparative advantage, and that significant asymmetries (k ≥ 2) translate into large rents. The economic intuition behind this fact follows from two effects. On one hand, an increase in k makes the object more valuable for the advantageous bidder who is then more willing to bid higher in order to ensure her winning. On the other hand, an increase in k aggravates the situation of the disadvantageous player who must now make an extra effort to win the auction. In particular, if she has sufficiently optimistic information about the common value (her signal is sufficiently high), she is force to bid higher the greater is her disadvantage. Since both effect are aligned, the impact of a larger asymmetry is a larger payment and hence a larger seller's revenue. 19 Formally, we here provide the right derivative.
To better asses the performance of the first-price format, in what follows we characterize the optimal auction to compare the seller's expected revenue in the first-price auction with the optimal auction and with the second price auction.
The optimal auction
From the revelation principle we can restrict attention to direct mechanisms. Denote by m i k (x i , x j ) the payment from i to the auctioneer when reported signals are x i and x j , and by p i k (x i , x j ) the probability that i gets the asset. Conditional on signal x i and announcementx i , bidder i's expected payoff is
and his truthtelling payoff is Π
The optimal auction solves the following problem
and such that the probabilities satisfy standard feasibility conditions, p 
we can rewrite ex-ante profits as
As expected profits are expected values minus expected payments, the optimal auction solves the problem
is the marginal revenue of bidder A,
Lemma 13 The optimal auction sets
; 0, otherwise.
Proof. Setting Π i k (0) > 0 is suboptimal and Π i k (0) < 0 violates the individual rationality or participation constraint. Since 2x i + x j − 1 may be negative it is optimal to have The optimal auction is biased against the disadvantage bidder. He wins the good only if his signal is sufficiently higher than the one of her opponent. To see this consider the case in which both bidders receive the same signal x ≥ 1/3. Bidder A wins with certainty as k(3x − 1) > 3x − 1 for any k > 1. Thus the disadvantageous bidder must have a signal strictly higher than the one of the advantageous bidder to win. Nevertheless the optimal auction does not exclude the disadvantageous bidder from bidding. For a given signal x D , the signal by the advantageous bidder must be higher than
to win.
At the optimal auction revenue to the seller becomes
Revenue at the SPA
When the auction is conducted as second price, in equilibrium, the advantageous bidder plays a very aggressive strategy, whereas the disadvantageous plays very conservatively. In particular, the following strategies constitute an equilibrium for any k > 1, b Bikhchandani (1988) ). The second price auction generates an expected revenue equal to 1/2. 
Revenue comparison
We have shown that the optimal auction does not exclude the disadvantageous bidder from bidding. This is also the case at the first price auction, whereas it does not hold at the second price auction. Further, in both first-price and optimal, revenue increases with k, whereas it is independent of k at the second price auction. It is hence clear that the first price is closer to the optimal than the second price. To see the difference in expected revenues between the three mechanisms, table below provides the expected seller revenue at the optimal auction (R OP ), at a second price auction R SP and at the first price auction R F P for different values of k.
The comparison for all values of k is the content of figure below. To obtain this figure, for the first price auction, we have numerically approximated the equilibrium correspondences, the bidding functions and the expected revenue.
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[Insert Figure 2 ]
Robustness
The model was based on a number of simplifying assumptions, and at this point we are interested in assessing the impact of relaxing them in our conclusions. In this section some alternative formulations are examined.
We have assumed here that V = x A + x D which does not allow to see how different assumptions on partial derivatives (including cross partial derivatives) affect the results.
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To undertake this analysis we here take V = g(x A + x D ) for any continuous function g.
22 When 1 ≤ k < 2 we use the system of differential equations given by
with the initial conditions φ 
with respect to x. Notice that Γ k (0) = R k , as it equals the sum of the bidders' expected payments. We numerically integrate (backwards) system above by using a Runge-Kutta method. Finally, to measure how the solutions change with k, we take a fine discrete grid of values of k. For k ∈ [2, 3) a similar method can be followed but taking for each k the values of s(k) and r(k) that determine the initial conditions. 23 We are very grateful to an anonymous referee who pointed this out.
Under this more general formulation the equilibrium bidding functions are the solutions to the system of differential equations
Using similar techniques to the ones employed in Section 3 it is easy to derive explicit expressions for the bidding functions in terms of the function g. They are given by:
For instance, when g(y) = y s , the bidding functions become
From the particular analytic structure of the above biding functions, it seems reasonable to claim that the results derived when
To asses this claim we have numerically computed the equilibrium for two partic-
To do so, we have concentrated on the region of small asymmetries. Note that the range of k in this region, k ∈ 1,k , depends on the common value functional form.
2 thenk is such that the valuation of player A-0, conditional upon winning over any type of player D, is equal to the smallest possible valuation of player
Once the range of k values is determined, we derive and then numerically solve, the implicit equations that define the equilibrium correspondences. Finally, we substitute these expressions into (17) and (18) and we numerically compute the bidding functions in the three cases , i.e., s = 1/2, 1, 2.
In Figure 3 (a) we show the equilibrium bidding functions for an advantageous bidders for k = 1.1 in the three scenarios, while Figure 3(b) shows the equilibrium bidding functions of the disadvantageous bidder. 24 It stems from these figures that the explosive impact on auction outcomes, resulting from the tiniest asymmetry, in second-price auctions do not extend to the first-price auction format. Furthermore, the numerically computed bidding functions are close to the symmetric equilibrium bidding function in the three cases, confirming the robustness of Theorem 6 to changes in the common value functional form.
[Insert Figure 3 ]
Finally, to further illustrate the behavior of the first price auction format we here also provide a graphical representation of the seller's expected revenue in the three scenarios.
Note that revenue is a monotone function of the degree of asymmetry, as illustrated in 
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
First note that in a first price auction the highest possible bid by each side must be the same. Otherwise, the player with the highest bid would be better off reducing his bid; he can still win with probability one while paying a lesser price. This fact provides the boundary condition:
We can hence define the bidding range as bids (or prices) below m(k). In what follows we only consider the range of prices which are common to both players.
24 Note that k = 1.1 lies in the range of small asymmetries in the three scenarios.
We first show that there cannot be simultaneous atoms at the same price. Assume that p is an atom for player i, i = A, D, i.e., there is an interval of signals of player i who are bidding the same price p. If this is the case, then all types of player j who get strictly positive expected utility when bidding p, must prefer to bid slightly above the atom. Just note that this ǫ−small deviation generates a positive surplus coming from the positive mass (atom) of i-players all bidding p. Hence, the only types of player j that could prefer to bid p rather than p + ǫ are those who get zero expected profits at p. But this can only happen for one type of player j as, for each player, the value is strictly increasing in her signal.
We now use the result above to show, by contradiction, that there cannot be gaps.
Assume that player i has a gap at some interval within the common range, say (p 1 , p 2 ].
Clearly, any player j is better off bidding outside the gap. Further, unless player i has an atom at the top of the gap, player j would do better to lower the price at p 1 than to pay p = p 2 + ǫ. The reason is that by doing so she lowers the price she has to pay by a positive (away from 0) amount, while she only reduces her probability of winning by ǫ.
Consequently, j must have a gap from p 1 or less to p > p 2 , contradicting that i bids in equilibrium p 2 . Consider then that i has an atom at the top of her gap. Then, either j also has an atom at p 2 which cannot happen in equilibrium as shown before, or j bids p 2 with zero probability. But then i should not bid p 2 with a positive probability. We can hence conclude that the bidding functions must be single-valued and continuous on the common range of prices.
We now show that if k ∈ [1, 2) then the common bidding range is the full range of prices. To do so we only need to show that the lowest bid is the same for both players, that is b To complete the proof we have to show that strategies are strictly increasing in the types so that there are no (individual) atoms. Observe that if i has an atom in the common range then there is no x j that is willing to bid just after the atom ends; x j would prefer to bid just below (if the value conditional on winning the types within the atom is smaller that the price) or, just above (if the bid gets increased by an arbitrarily small amount whereas the probability of winning increases by the range of the atom).
Consequently, since we have shown that there are no gaps, any atom must be at the bottom of the common bidding range. But this cannot be the case either. Note that if k < 2 it would imply that a player with signal larger than 0 follows a weakly dominated strategy (bids zero rather than close to her positive signal). Since there can be no interval within the common bidding range at which a bidder bids with probability zero, players cannot choose mixed strategies. This completes the proof. Rearranging we get
or, equivalently, lim inf
Since type φ 
